Scientific Antirealists Have Set Fire to Their Own Houses by Park, Seungbae
1 
 
Scientific Antirealists Have Set Fire to Their Own Houses 
 
Abstract 
Scientific antirealists run the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism. I 
argue that the argument from underconsideration backfires on antirealists’ positive 
philosophical theories, such as the contextual theory of explanation (van Fraassen, 1980), the 
English model of rationality (van Fraassen, 1989), the evolutionary explanation of the success 
of science (Wray, 2008; 2012), and explanatory idealism (Khalifa, 2013). Antirealists 
strengthen the argument from underconsideration with the pessimistic induction against 
current scientific theories. In response, I construct a pessimistic induction against antirealists 
that since antirealists generated problematic philosophical theories in the past, they must be 
generating problematic philosophical theories now. 
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Bas van Fraassen (1989), K. Brad Wray (2008, 2012), and Kareem Khalifa (2010) run the 
argument from underconsideration against scientific realism. This paper analyzes it and then 
explores its disastrous implications on antirealists’ positive philosophical theories, such as 
van Fraassen’s (1980) contextual theory of explanation, van Fraassen’s (1989) English model 
of rationality, Wray’s (2007, 2010) evolutionary explanation of the success of science, and 
Khalifa’s (2013) explanatory idealism. All these positive philosophical theories are 
unwarranted, if the argument from underconsideration is correct. 
Wray (2008, 2012) and Khalifa (2010) strengthen the argument from 
underconsideration with pessimistic inductions against scientists and scientific theories. In 
response, I construct a pessimistic induction against antirealists that since antirealists 
generated problematic philosophical theories in the past, they must be generating problematic 
philosophical theories now. I present some examples of their philosophical theories that 
turned out to be problematic and an example that will turn out to be problematic. This paper 
could be a sobering reminder to antirealists that their criticisms against scientists and their 
scientific theories can be turned against antirealists and their positive philosophical theories. 
 
2. The Argument from Underconsideration 
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Suppose that we have two rival scientific theories, T1 and T2, that are more or less empirically 
equivalent but logically inconsistent with each other. We infer that T1 is true on the grounds 
that it explains phenomena better than T2, i.e., it provides the best explanation of the 
phenomena. Such an inference is called inference to the best explanation (IBE). Scientists use 
IBE to establish their scientific theories.  
Van Fraassen (1989) rejects IBE. His rejection is based on the observation that for any 
scientific theory, there might be rival theories that we have not yet conceived. In addition to 
T1 and T2, there might be T3, T4, and so on. Moreover, truth may lie not in the range of the 
conceived rival theories but in the range of the unconceived rival theories. So what?  
 
So our selection may well be the best of a bad lot. … For me to take it that the best of set X will 
be more likely to be true than not, requires a prior belief that the truth is already more likely to 
be found in X, than not. (van Fraassen, 1989: 143) 
 
In other words, in order to infer that the best available theory is true, realists first should show 
that scientists “are by nature predisposed to hit on the right range of hypotheses” (van 
Fraassen, 1989: 143), or that “none of the possible explanations we have failed to come up 
with is as good as the best of the ones we have” (Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, and van 
Fraassen, 1997: 306). The burden of proof is not on van Fraassen but on realists because it is 
realists who believe that the best available theory is true.  
     Van Fraassen’s argument against IBE above is called the argument from a bad lot or the 
argument from underconsideration in the literature. The premise of the argument is that the 
best of the conceived rivals may be the best of a bad lot, and the conclusion of the argument 
is that realists are unwarranted in believing that the best of the conceived rivals is true: 
 
..the possibility that there may be equally good rival theories to T already suffices to make an 
ampliative step from the evidence to T unwarranted. (Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, and van 
Fraassen, 1997: 309) 
 
That is, though scientists may be reliable in their judgments about the relative superiority of a 
theory with respect to any theoretical virtue, such judgments do not warrant the conclusion that 
the superior theory is likely true. (Wray, 2008: 321) 
 
The argument from underconsideration amounts to the request to justify the thesis of 
epistemic privilege that scientists are prone to hit upon true theories. If scientists have such a 
privilege, truth would be more likely be found in the set of conceived rivals than in the set of 
unconceived rivals, i.e., the best of the conceived rivals would be likely to be better than all 
the unconceived rivals, so we would be warranted in believing that the best explanation is 
true. 
 
3. Epistemic Privilege 
Psillos argues that scientists have epistemic privilege in that they use background theories to 
“drastically narrow down the space in which hypotheses can provide a potential explanation 
of the evidence at hand” (1999: 218-219). In other words, the theories that conflict with the 
background theories are eliminated, so the theories that are compatible with background 
theories are more likely to be true than false. Therefore, the best of the conceived rival 
theories is apt to be true.  
Similarly, Lipton (2004: 151) argues that scientists rank T1 and T2, conceived rivals, in 
the light of background theories. Antirealists admit that scientists’ evaluative judgment of T1 
and T2 is trustworthy, so they should also admit that background theories are true. After all, if 
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background theories are false, how can scientists rank T1 and T2 properly? The true 
background theories endow scientists with the epistemic privilege to conceive of a set of rival 
theories that includes a true theory.  
Wray replies that we do not have good reason to believe that background theories are 
true in the first place, and that all that we know about those theories is that “they save the 
phenomena and are superior to the theories with which they were compared” (2008: 321). 
Scientists can know that T1 is predictively more accurate than T2 even when background 
theories are false but empirically adequate. The evaluation of the conceived rivals does not 
require that background theories be true. It requires only that they be empirically adequate. 
Furthermore, given that background theories might be false, they “are as likely to be an 
impediment to developing a true theory as they are likely to be an asset to developing a true 
theory” (Wray, 2012: 379).  
Khalifa (2010: 95) forms an alliance with Wray. He says that scientists can evaluate T1 
as better than T2 on the grounds that T1 is simpler than T2, and that T1 explains more diverse 
phenomena than T2. This comparative judgment, however, can be made even when 
background theories are false. Furthermore, Albert Einstein rejected classical mechanics 
when he developed the theory of relativity. If he had used classical mechanics as a 
background theory, he could not have developed the theory of relativity. Therefore, using 
background theories as a guide to develop a theory does not entail “that the latter must be true” 
(Khalifa, 2010: 96). Thus, background theories do not yield the epistemic privilege that 
scientists have the proclivity to produce true theories. 
Wray and Khalifa go further than diffusing Psillos and Lipton’s appeal to background 
theories. They reinforce the argument from underconsideration with pessimistic inductions:  
 
There is a good reason why Lipton did not attempt to argue directly against the no-privilege 
premise. The bulk of evidence seems to suggest it is true. I have in mind here the arguments 
developed by Larry Laudan, Martin Carrier, P. Kyle Stanford, and others. (Wray, 2008: 322) 
 
..while background theories certainly narrow the space of potential explanations, there appears 
to be a compelling pessimistic induction that raises serious questions about the reliability of this 
process. (Khalifa, 2010: 97) 
 
Larry Laudan (1977: 126) and P. Kyle Stanford (2006) run different pessimistic inductions. 
Laudan’s pessimistic induction is against scientific theories, saying that since successful past 
scientific theories turned out to be false, successful present scientific theories will also turn 
out to be false. In contrast, Stanford’s pessimistic induction is against scientists, saying that 
science past scientists could not conceive of present theories, present scientists cannot 
conceive of future theories. The difference between the two pessimistic inductions, however, 
is not important in this paper. What is important for the purpose of this paper is that if they 
are correct, present theories are false, and that using such theories as background theories is 
more likely to generate false theories than true theories. 
 
4. Antirealist Theories 
In my view, the argument from underconsideration backfires on antirealists’ positive 
philosophical theories. Consider that van Fraassen (1989) distinguishes between the Prussian 
model and the English model of rationality. On the Prussian model, “what it is rational to 
believe is exactly what one is rationally compelled to believe,” whereas on the English model, 
“what it is rational to believe includes anything that one is not rationally compelled to 
disbelieve” (van Fraassen, 1989: 171-172). He chooses the English model over the Prussian 
model. A problem is that in order to choose the English model, he should first show that it is 
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better than the Prussian model, and that the true model of rationality is more likely to fall in 
the range of the two conceived models than in the range of unconceived models. The burden 
of proof is not on realists but on van Fraassen because it is he, not realists, who opts for the 
English model over the Prussian model. 
     The English model of rationality is not the only antirealist theory that falls prey to the 
argument from underconsideration. Van Fraassen (1980, Chapter 5) argues that his contextual 
theory of explanation is true because it can account for rejections and asymmetries while the 
rival theories proposed by Carl G. Hempel (1966), Wesley C. Salmon (1971), and Michael 
Friedman (1974) cannot. Wray (2007, 2010) appeals to Darwin’s evolutionary theory to 
explain the success of science, arguing that his evolutionary explanation is better than the 
realist explanation because the evolutionary explanation can accommodate failures and 
competitions of scientific theories while the realist explanation cannot. Khalifa defends 
explanatory idealism according to which understanding ought to be evaluated by how well it 
replicates “the understanding provided by knowledge of a good and correct explanation” 
(2013: 162). All these antirealists’ positive philosophical theories are unwarranted because 
antirealists have not yet shown that they have the propensity to generate true philosophical 
theories. 
In response, antirealists might point out differences between scientific theories and 
philosophical theories. For example, scientific theories are tested against observations, 
whereas philosophical theories are tested against intuitions. It follows that scientific theories 
are susceptible to the argument from underconsideration, whereas philosophical theories are 
not. On this account, unlike scientists, antirealists are epistemically privileged to develop true 
theories.  
This move to insulate philosophical theories from the backfire, however, is 
incompatible with what antirealists say about Putnam’s (1975: 73) no-miracles argument for 
scientific realism. Putnam argues that a scientific theory is successful because it is 
approximately true. It would be a miracle if a successful theory is not even approximately 
true. The explanation invoking approximate truth is better than the explanation invoking a 
miracle. Therefore, realism provides the best explanation of the success of science. Note that 
Putnam is using IBE to establish realism. Laudan objects that the no-miracles argument “is a 
monumental case of begging the question” (1981: 45). Arthur Fine also objects that the no-
miracles argument is “a paradigm case of begging the question” (1991: 82). Their idea is that 
from the antirealist perspective, IBE is a deplorable rule of inference, so it is of no use for 
Putnam to use it to justify realism. An interesting implication of Laudan and Fine’s criticism 
against Putnam’s no-miracles argument is that the philosophical use of IBE is no different 
from the scientific use of IBE. It follows that the argument from underconsideration applies 
no less to antirealists’ philosophical theories. Antirealists cannot say that their philosophical 
theories are immune to the argument from underconsideration, while scientific theories are 
not. Antirealists have fallen into a quagmire that they created for realists.  
     Regarding the quagmire, realists are better off than antirealists. Suppose that both 
realists and antirealists use IBE to establish each of their positive philosophical theories. 
Realists are begging the question against antirealists, so realists’ theories do not sound 
plausible to antirealists. It should, however, sound plausible to realists themselves and to 
other realists because they all accept IBE as reliable. In contrast, antirealists are begging the 
question against themselves, so their theories should not sound convincing even to 
themselves. Thus, they cannot say confidently to their epistemic colleagues that their theories 
are true. Their epistemic colleagues would rightly dismiss antirealists’ theories on the grounds 
that even the proponents of the theories are not confident that they are true. Thus, if we are 
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antirealists, we cannot achieve the epistemic goal “to propagate to others our own theories 
which we are confident about” (Park, 2017). 
 
5. Empirically Adequate? 
Antirealists might argue that although we are not justified in believing that their positive 
philosophical theories are true, we are justified in believing that they are empirically adequate. 
For example, van Fraassen might say that his contextual theory of explanation is empirically 
adequate. Given that the contextual theory was proposed to account for explanatory 
phenomena, such as rejections and asymmetries, the empirical adequacy of the theory means 
that explanatory phenomena occurred, occur, and will occur in science, i.e., the contextual 
theory of explanation saves explanatory phenomena in science.  
     There are two problems with settling for the empirical adequacy of a philosophical 
theory. First, we expect our philosophical theory of science to give us an insight into the deep 
underlying structure of science. Such an insight, however, can be derived from the belief that 
it is true, but not from the belief that it is merely empirically adequate. For example, 
explanatory phenomena occur in science. We wonder why they occur. The contextual theory 
of explanation says that they occur because an explanation is an answer to a why-question, 
and appropriateness of an answer to the question depends on context. But if we believe that it 
is merely empirically adequate, we can only believe that explanatory phenomena occur in 
science, and we would still be puzzled over why they occur.  
Second, as Psillos (1997: 370) observes, the antirealist quest for empirical adequacy 
requires epistemic privilege just like the realist quest for truth. Suppose that T1 and T2 
compete with each other, and that T1 explains phenomena better than T2. It does not follow 
that T1 is empirically adequate. After all, both T1 and T2 might be far less than empirically 
adequate. In order to infer that T1 is empirically adequate, antirealists should show 
beforehand that empirical adequacy is more likely to fall in the set of the conceived theories 
than in the set of unconceived theories.  
     In response to Psillos’s observation, Wray claims that constructive empiricism is not 
committed to the position that a successful theory is empirically adequate:  
 
But, the constructive empiricist is not committed to claiming that our best theories are in fact 
empirically adequate. What van Fraassen claims is that science aims for empirically adequate 
theories (see van Fraassen 1980, 12). (Wray, 2012: 378) 
 
The suggestion that science aims for empirically adequate theories is compatible with the 
belief that successful current theories are empirically inadequate. Since constructive 
empiricism is neutral as to whether successful current theories are empirically adequate or 
inadequate, van Fraassen does not have the burden to show that empirical adequacy is more 
likely to exist in the range of conceived theories than in the range of unconceived theories.  
     In my view, however, Wray’s interpretation of constructive empiricism here conflicts 
with what he says elsewhere about antirealism and van Fraassen’s position. He writes as if 
antirealists, including van Fraassen, believe that a successful theory is empirically adequate:  
 
The only thing anti-realists are sceptical about are the claims (i) that what our theories say about 
unobservable entities and processes is true (see, for example, van Fraassen 1980), and (ii) that 
we have good reason to believe that the true theory is amongst those we are choosing between 
(see, for example, Stanford 2006). (Wray, 2008: 320) 
 
Hence, strictly speaking, all that scientists can claim to know about their background theories is 
that they save the phenomena and are superior to the theories with which they were compared. 
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(Wray, 2008: 321) 
 
Neither realist nor anti-realist denies that the claims that successful scientific theories make 
about observable phenomena are true. (Wray, 2012: 376) 
 
These writings indicate that Wray understands van Fraassen to be claiming that a successful 
theory is empirically adequate. For example, Wray claims that scientists can claim to know 
that background theories save phenomena. To say that a theory saves phenomena means that 
the theory explains past, present, and future phenomena in its domain, i.e., that the theory is 
empirically adequate (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). 
Suppose, however, that Wray is right that constructive empiricism is neutral as to 
whether successful current theories are empirically adequate or inadequate. Wray faces the 
following challenge. Antirealism is an interesting philosophical position because it is in the 
middle between realism and skepticism. It becomes an uninteresting position once it 
collapses into skepticism. Not surprisingly, some antirealists resist skepticism: 
 
Skepticism is an ugly threat; a philosophical position which leads to skepticism reduces itself to 
absurdity. (Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, and van Fraassen, 1997: 317)  
 
If antirealists resist skepticism, they need to tell us what they think we are justified in 
inferring from the fact that a theory is successful, and what they think we are rationally 
compelled to believe on the basis of the fact that a theory is successful. 
Moreover, it does not matter whether or not van Fraassen is committed to the position 
that a successful theory is empirically adequate. What is important is that the quest for 
empirical adequacy requires epistemic privilege. Anyone who believes that a successful 
theory is empirically adequate should first show that scientists have the proclivity to generate 
empirically adequate theories as opposed to empirically inadequate theories. In a nutshell, 
Psillos’s observation stands that the argument from underconsideration undercuts the position 
that a successful theory is empirically adequate. 
 
6. Strengthening 
So far I have exposed the disastrous implications of the argument from underconsideration on 
antirealists’ positive philosophical theories. I now argue that it has inherent problems. The 
first intrinsic problem is that it is self-defeating. The concept of warrant figures in the 
conclusion of the argument, so in order for the argument to work, proponents of the argument 
should first offer a plausible theory of warrant. Suppose that they offer a theory of warrant to 
complement the deficiency of the argument. After proposing the theory, however, they should 
show that their theory of warrant is better than the rival theories of warrant that already exist 
in the epistemology literature. Notably, they are foundationalism (Alston, 1976), coherentism 
(Bonjour, 1985), and reliabilism (Goldman, 1979, 1992). Next, they should show that the true 
theory of warrant is more likely to be found in the set of the conceived theories of warrant 
than in the set of unconceived theories of warrant. 
The second inherent problem with the argument from underconsideration is that the 
conclusion does not follow from the premise. Recall that the premise of the argument is that 
the best of the conceived rivals may be the best of a bad lot, and that the conclusion is that it 
is unwarranted to believe that the best of the conceived rivals is true. Note that the premise is 
a possibility statement whereas the conclusion is a normative statement. David Hume 
famously argued that there is a gap between a descriptive statement and a normative 
statement. Thus, he would say that there is a much wider gap between the possibility 
statement and the normative statement of the argument from underconsideration. 
7 
 
     Antirealists might reply that there is a significant possibility that our best conceived 
theories may be the best of a bad lot, and the significant possibility is enough to justify the 
normative statement. To use an analogy, if there is a significant possibility that it will rain 
today, I should take an umbrella with me when I leave for the office in the morning. 
Analogously, if there is a significant possibility that our best theories are false, realists should 
show beforehand that scientists are more apt to construct true theories than false theories. The 
history of science indicates that successful past theories have turned out to be false, so 
successful present theories will also turn out to be false. As previously mentioned, Wray and 
Khafila boost the argument from underconsideration with the pessimistic inductions. 
     Wray and Khafila’s appeal to the pessimistic inductions invites me to briefly 
summarize what realists have said in the literature to refute them. They have said as follows: 
The samples of past theories are biased (Ruhmkorff, 2011; Park, 2011a). Present theories are 
more successful than past theories (Doppelt, 2007; Devitt, 2011; Fahrbach, 2011; Park, 
2011a). Unlike past theories, some present theories make novel predictions (Leplin, 1997; 
Saatsi, 2009). Unlike past theories, some present theories are not only successful but also 
cohere with one another (Park, 2011b). Successful past theories are approximately true 
because their working components are true (Kitcher, 1993: 140-149; Psillos, 1999 Chapters 5 
and 6). Mathematical structures (Worrall, 1989) and Ramsey sentences (Cruse and Papineau, 
2002) are carried over through scientific revolutions. The (approximate) truth of our best 
theories explains not only their own success but also the success of their predecessors 
(Doppelt, 2014). 
Set aside these realist responses to the pessimistic inductions. My reaction to them in 
this paper is to construct a pessimistic induction against antirealists that antirealists have 
made philosophical mistakes in the past, so they must be making philosophical mistakes now. 
On this account, antirealists’ past theories were disclosed to be problematic, so their present 
theories will also be disclosed to be problematic. Their present theories are such theories as 
Khalifa’s explanatory idealism (2013). For now, Khalifa’s explanatory idealism appears to be 
unproblematic, but the problems with it will be conceived and exposed in the future. It does 
not matter what it says and what argument is advanced in defense of it. What matters for the 
pessimistic induction to work is the fact that it is constructed by an antirealist, and the fact 
that antirealists generated problematic philosophical theories in the past. These two facts 
constitute an inductive rationale for thinking that it has hitherto hidden problems. 
What philosophical errors did antirealists make in the past? I can only summarize their 
past mistakes in the interest of saving space. As noted earlier, van Fraassen, Wray, and 
Khalifa produced positive philosophical theories without being aware that their criticisms 
against realism backfire on their theories. There are other antirealist blunders. Laudan claims 
that science is successful “because scientific theories result from a winnowing process” (1984: 
101). Clearly, he is using IBE, so his aforementioned criticism against Putnam’s no-miracles 
argument applies no less to his own explanation of the success of science. Ladyman et al. 
(1997: 308) claim that approximate truth is harder to come by than empirical adequacy. But 
empirical adequacy is harder to come by than approximate truth in light of the pessimistic 
induction (Park, 2014a). Wray (2007, 2010) defends the evolutionary explanation of the 
success of science. But it is inconsistent for Wray to defend the evolutionary explanation and 
to wield the pessimistic induction against realism because the pessimistic induction indicates 
that the evolutionary explanation is neither true nor empirically adequate (Park, 2014b). The 
list of antirealists’ past blunders can be extended at nauseam. The list is an inductive rationale 




This pessimistic induction against antirealists is different from the pessimistic 
induction which I (2014c) have constructed. I (2014c) have exposed intrinsic problems with 
eight antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature, and then predicted that 
the latest one (Lyons, 2003) will turn out to be problematic. While the pessimistic induction 
in my (2014c) paper is over the antirealist explanations of the success of science, the 
pessimistic induction in the present paper is over antirealists. The latter concerns antirealists’ 
abilities to construct philosophical theories in general, encompassing not only their abilities 
to construct antirealist explanations of the success of science but also their abilities to 
construct other positive philosophical theories, whatever they might be. So the latter has a 
much broader scope than the former. 
Khalifa might protest that his philosophical theory can account for its explananda, and 
it was constructed in light of background philosophical theories, so his theory is true. Let me 
remind him, however, that he earlier rejected our best scientific theories, although they are 
successful and although they were constructed in light of background scientific theories. His 
rejection of our best theories is based on the historical fact that successful past theories were 
revealed to be false. My rejection of his philosophical theory is on a par with his rejection of 
scientific theories. I am rejecting his theory simply because antirealists’ past theories turned 
out to be problematic. 
Khalifa might retort that he did not collaborate with other antirealists, such as Ladyman 
et al. (1997), with the view to making mistakes together. Nor were blunder genes transmitted 
from Ladyman et al. to him. It follows that there is no causal link between Ladyman et al.’s 
mistake and his theorizing. It is wrong to think that Ladyman et al.’s mistake denigrates his 
theorizing, and that he inherits Ladyman et al.’s problems simply because he belongs to the 
same species as they, Homo sapiens. 
Realists, however, would make similar points about the relationship between past and 
present scientists. Present scientists did not collaborate with past scientists with the purpose 
to make mistakes together. Nor did blunder genes propagate from past scientists to present 
scientists. It follows that past scientists’ mistakes do not stand in a causal relation to present 
scientists’ theorizing. It is wrong to think that past scientists’ mistakes denigrate present 
scientific theories, and that present scientists inherit past scientists’ problems simply because 
present scientists belong to the same species as past scientists, Homo sapiens. 
Khalifa might insist that there is no relevant difference between past and present 
scientists, or between past and present theories, so present theories will be abandoned as were 
past ones. In response, I say the same thing about antirealists and antirealist philosophical 
theories. There is no relevant difference between Ladyman et al. and Khalifa, and between 
the former’s philosophical view and the latter’s philosophical view. Therefore, Khalifa’s view 
will become outdated as did Ladyman et al.’s. 
Henri Poincaré (1905/1952: 160), Mary Hesse (1976: 266), Laudan (1977: 126), 
Stanford (2006), Wray (2007, 2010), and Khalifa (2010) run pessimistic inductions against 
scientists and scientific theories. They all agree that past mistakes constitute an inductive 
rationale for thinking that current scientific theories are false. In my view, if their pessimistic 
inductions are correct, so is my pessimistic induction against antirealists. Their pessimistic 
inductions and my pessimistic induction rise or fall together. Stanford claims that past and 
present scientists are similar in that they are all “creatures whose cognitive constitutions are 
not well suited to the task of exhausting the kinds of spaces of serious candidate theoretical 
explanations from which our scientific theories are drawn” (2006: 45). If Stanford is right, 
there is no relevant cognitive difference either between Ladyman et al. and Khalifa that 
would save Khalifa’s explanatory idealism from my pessimistic induction. 
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In order to diffuse my pessimistic induction against antirealists, antirealists might tap 
into the aforementioned realist responses to the pessimistic inductions against scientists and 
scientific theories. For example, they might take issue with the sample of my pessimistic 
induction, arguing that it is not representative of the general population of past philosophical 
theories generated by antirealists, which mirrors the observation made by Ruhmkorff (2011) 
and me (2011a) that the samples of the pessimistic inductions are biased. Or antirealists might 
argue that the problems with their past philosophical theories are not serious but moderate, 
which echoes the contention made by Kitcher (1993) and Psillos (1999) that successful past 
scientific theories are not completely false but approximately true.  
I welcome this antirealist move because it amounts to admitting that the realist 
responses to the pessimistic inductions against realism are on the right track and because new 
fields of debate might open over whose sample is better, and over whether the problems with 
antirealists’ past philosophical theories are serious or moderate. In any event, what is at stake 
in this possible future debate is whether antirealists’ present philosophical theories are tenable 
or not. They have hidden serious problems, if it transpires that my sample is fair, and that 
antirealists’ past philosophical theories are seriously problematic. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The argument from underconsideration is a challenge to show that scientists are predisposed 
to generate true theories. The pessimistic inductions against scientists and scientific theories, 
if correct, show that scientists are prone to produce false theories. These antirealist criticisms 
against realism are forceful and admirable. The brilliant criticisms, however, can be turned 
against antirealists’ own positive philosophical theories. Antirealists have the burden to show 
that they have the proclivity to develop true philosophical theories. My pessimistic induction 
against antirealists, if correct, shows that antirealists have the tendency to generate 
problematic philosophical theories. 
The antirealism program is different from the strong program in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge. The strong program aims to provide sociological explanations of how 
scientific knowledge is produced. It adheres to the reflexivity tenet that “its patterns of 
explanations must be applicable to sociology itself” (Bloor, 1991: 7). The reflexivity tenet 
ensures that the explanatory scheme of the strong program is applicable to sociology of 
knowledge itself. There is no analogous tenet in the antirealist program. The presence of such 
a tenet would have brought down the chance that antirealists wield the argument from 
underconsideration and the pessimistic inductions against scientists and scientific theories 
without being aware that their critiques backfire on their own positive philosophical theories. 
In any event, this paper can be summed up in a simple sentence: antirealists have set fire to 
their own houses. 
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